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Look at the Issues,” PIDS Policy Notes No. 96-02, September 1996.
Breaking away from the formula lending approach
Early on in the Estrada administration, the Housing
and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC)
crafted an innovative approach to housing finance. It was
innovative because it broke away from the old approach
to housing finance which past administrations had em-
ployed in an attempt to address the huge backlog in the
shelter sector. The old approach was to use the funds of
the Social Security System (SSS), Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) and Pag-Ibig to finance the Uni-
fied Home Lending Program (UHLP) of the government.
Under the so-called “formula lending” of the old approach,
developers or private housing contractors originated the
housing loans from eligible borrowers and then submit-
ted the mortgage papers to the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) for take out. As the public
knows, this strategy led to the bankruptcy of the
government’s housing program in view of the inability to
collect loan repayments.1
Under former HUDCC Secretary-General Karina
David's leadership, the HUDCC redefined the govern-
ment’s role in the housing market (Box 1). The major
changes consisted of tapping the private mortgage mar-
ket to finance the housing demand of low income groups
and targeting housing subsidies to low income house-
holds. Thus, under the new approach, the government
has chosen to pursue an enabling role where its main
job is to provide the environment for private sector par-
ticipation in the housing market. While subsidies will still
be provided, they are, however, only targeted for poor
households.
The rationale for this market-based housing finance
approach adopted by HUDCC was to integrate socialized
housing into the mainstream financial markets. This came
about as government planners realized that there is no
way that government would be able to finance all the




] Formulate a comprehensive shelter program in accord with
a defined national urban policy framework that will regard
the sector as a critical component of both social and eco-
nomic policy
] Develop a sustainable, market-oriented housing finance
system that will encourage maximum private sector par-
ticipation
] Design a system that will focus and effectively address the
need of the bottom 30 percent of the society
] Facilitate a decentralized shelter delivery system that will
bolster valuable community support, thus making it de-
mand-responsive
Strategies Strategies
] Initiate reforms in the housing finance system to enable
private sector participation in housing finance and produc-
tion improvement of institutional infrastructures in the pri-
mary mortgage market as well as the development of a
secondary mortgage market through securitization review
and rationalization of the shelter agencies’ operations
] Institute the Housing Assistance Fund (HAF), an “on-
budget” subsidy fund, and a corresponding transparent
targeting mechanism
] Provide an unambiguous support to the low-end sector via
explicit, nominal grants as against distortive interest and
tax subsidies to mortgage loans
] Encourage involvement of private institutions in socialized
housing finance by allowing the sector to operate within
the market interest rates
] Enable efficient rental market to augment shelter provi-
sion for less affluent and more mobile households
] Render accessibility to developmental, cooperative-led and
community-based lending through decentralized housing
delivery via the local government units (LGUs)
Role of the government Role of the government
] Strengthen and define legal regulatory framework that will
govern the housing finance system
Box 1. The Housing Finance Program of the Estrada Administration*
] Provide adequate fund to the HAF and identify other wel-
fare-enhancing programs
] Extend technical assistance to the LGUs in formulating
proactive local planning
Role of the key housing agencies Role of the key housing agencies
] Rationalize management and implementation of the hous-
ing programs
l HUDCC – undertake effective supervision and coordi-
nation of all agencies
l NHMFC – improve collection efficiency
l HIGC – enhance risk management capability
l HDMF – develop asset-liability management
Role of the private sector Role of the private sector
] Private developers and lending institutions – handle origi-
nation and channeling of funds to homebuyers
] Banks – engage in enhanced investment in mortgage-lending
especially in socialized housing; undertake financial ad-
vising and intermediation in the securitization program
] NGOs – facilitate community-organizing
] Private investors – provide liquidity through investments
in asset-backed securities
The primary mortgage market The primary mortgage market
] The proposed Plan for Shelter and Urban Development
Sector principally adopts the framework of previous pri-
mary mortgage programs of the National Shelter Program,
e.g., resettlement, community-based lending, retail lend-
ing, guarantees, and others except the ailing and structur-
ally-flawed programs which will be discontinued.
] There will be an explicit prioritization in socialized hous-
ing, e.g., 80%-20% allocation of aggregate public resources
in favor of low-cost housing programs; specified target share
of developmental lending including guarantee provisions.
] An innovative “on-budget” subsidy (Housing Assistance
Fund) will be established to complement the regular low-
cost programs under the housing agencies and promote
greater room for private bank low-cost lending. Banks and
other lending institutions are unable to compete under the
former strategy because of the distortive interest subsi-
dies of government loan offers.
] Moreover, under the HAF, the subsidization period of loan
amortization of qualified borrowers will be reduced from
————————
*Under former Sec. Karina David's HUDCC helmsmanship.3
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25 years to 10 years. This is due to the consideration of
the rising capability of the borrowers to service their loans
over time. That is, while amortization remains constant in
nominal terms, nominal income increases due to inflation
and income improvements. The problem of loan
affordability then is re-assumed to exist only for a maxi-
mum of ten years.
] Effective implementation, e.g., adequate fund releases and
collection efficiency should, however, be installed to avoid
the pitfalls of the previous programs.
] Development of auxiliary infrastructure should also be
achieved to help ensure the programs’ success.
Implementation strategy Implementation strategy
] Private developers would continue to assume their usual
roles as loans originators and channels of funds. On the
other hand, banks are expected to take greater roles in
mortgage financing including low-cost housing, with the
trend towards minimization of distortive interest subsidies,
particularly in retail lending.
The secondary mortgage market The secondary mortgage market
The other important component of the Plan for Shelter and
Urban Development Sector is the development of the second-
ary mortgage market through securitization of assets.
Box 1 (cont'd)
huge losses under the formula lending approach and the
inappropriate incentives that misdirected housing subsi-
dies could create.2 Subsidies as a whole create distor-
tions in the financial markets and discourage the partici-
pation of private lenders who obviously cannot compete
with the government’s subsidized programs. The social
costs of subsidizing housing loans and misdirecting sub-
sidies to nonpoor borrowers are quite high (Table 1).
Abandoning an innovative approach
Unfortunately, however, the government had a re-
cent change of heart when it decided to abandon this
innovative, market-based approach adopted by HUDCC
in favor of a formula lending and subsidized approach.
With this shift, there is a possible repetition of the sad
results experienced under past administrations where:3
] the National Shelter Program that relied on for-
mula lending led to a heavy fiscal burden for the economy,
] pension fund members and low-income taxpay-
ers bore not only the funding responsibility but also the
credit risk of nonperforming housing loan programs of
the government,
] credit incentives led to various disincentives that
distorted the financial market and discouraged real pri-
vate participation in the housing finance market, and
] the housing subsidies under the UHLP and for-
mula lending were regressive, benefiting nonpoor mem-
bers of society instead of the real target beneficiaries—
the poor.
Is there light at the end of the tunnel?4
In order to prevent these distortions and inequities
in the housing market to happen again, what options are
thus open to the government to address the housing prob-
lem? One option is to deregulate the rental market that
has constricted the supply of dwelling units for rent. An-
other is to reinstitute the market-based housing finance
approach earlier adopted by the present administration
to enable low-income borrowers to finance their purchase
of houses through loans.
Developing the rental housing market. It should
be noted that the prevailing bias for all households to
own houses regardless of their economic capacity rests
on a wrong assumption. Not everyone in society can af-
ford to buy and own a house. The real problem is not how
to provide everyone a house to own but how to provide
access to affordable and decent shelter. This objective
can be achieved through several mechanisms:
————————
2The incompatibility of incentives under formula lending was ex-
plained in Gilberto M. Llanto and others (1997).
3The empirical support is found in the study by Llanto and others
(1997, 1998).
4This draws on Gilberto Llanto and Leilanie Basilio (1999), “Hous-
ing Policy, Strategy and Recent Developments in Market-Based Housing




5They are understandably active in the middle- and high-income
mortgage market.
] renting,
] ownership through purchase or private transfer
(e.g., through inheritance, donation), and
] public housing for certain sectors of society
(e.g., the poorest of the poor).
For this to happen, housing markets, including hous-
ing finance, should work efficiently. Thus, the rental mar-
ket should be freed in order to encourage greater supply
of dwelling units for rent.
The problem with the prevailing bias for homeowner-
ship and control of the rental market is that these invari-
ably raise the cost of the government’s housing program.
The desire to provide housing to the majority of the popu-
lation raises expectations that the government should
provide access to homeownership at all cost. At the same
time, this also motivates private economic agents who
benefit from the subsidies to lobby for more funding for
an unsustainable housing program.
Developing market-based housing finance. Several
developments in the housing finance markets indicate
that it is possible to have a low-cost housing program
that relies on the market for financ-
ing. Before we discuss these recent
innovations, however, it is important
to understand why banks seem reluc-
tant to venture into low-cost housing
finance.
The banking system constitutes
more than three-quarters of the total
assets of the financial system. None-
theless, except for their limited par-
ticipation in the National Shelter
Program's UHLP which used formula
lending, banks have not taken an ac-
tive role in low-cost housing finance.5
This can be partly explained by the
negative effect of government-subsi-
dized programs which have discour-
aged the development of the primary
market for housing, and by the short-term orientation of
bank assets where the banks’ short-term liabilities do
not match the long-term nature of households’ housing
loans. This mismatch of borrowing short and lending long
produces risks of term intermediation. These term risks
are inherently associated with the relative illiquidity of
the housing good, the opportunity costs of unadjustable
interest rates, and exposure to currency risks, if housing
loan programs are financed by foreign loans.
In the low-cost housing sector, banks face not only
high transaction costs but also information asymmetry.
The lack of information on creditworthiness, relative credit
risks and other risks can discourage bank lending to low-
income households. The offset could be high interest
rates that will cover risks and generate some profit for
the lender. However, adverse selection and moral hazard
problems arise, making this approach untenable. Thus,
in the absence of information, collateral and substantial
equity from the low-income borrower, and the lack of long-
Low Middle High
     % of Beneficiaries 38 33 29
     % of Loan Value 26 33 41
     % of Delinquent Loans 11 36 53
Definition of Income groups:
Low     -   households with monthly income below P5,000
Middle  -  households with monthly income P5,000 - below P7,500
High     -  households with monthly income above P7,500
Source:  Gilberto Llanto et al. (1998), "A Study of Housing Subsidies in the Philippines,"
PIDS Discussion Paper Series No. 98-42.
Income Group
Subsidy Incidence






Table 1. Cost and Incidence of Subsidies under the UHLP, 1993-955
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term funds, banks rarely take on mortgage loans of low-
income households.
What then are some recent innovations in market-
based housing finance that seem to offer a way out?
Below are three areas which may be considered,
namely, (a) contract savings for housing, (b) role of con-
tractual savings, and (c) mortgage-backed securitization.
] Contract Savings for Housing Scheme. Contract
savings for housing (CSH) system is essentially a con-
tract between a household and a financial institution con-
cerning the granting of a loan, provided that the house-
hold meets the minimum savings commitment over a
specified period of time at a prescribed rate. The accu-
mulated savings can be the household’s equity to the
loan. They can also be used as security for their mort-
gages with banks.
This system integrates the households into the bank-
ing system. That is, in the absence of sufficient sources
of long-term deposits for banks, CSH offers a disciplined,
regular saving pattern from households. From the per-
spective of the financial institution, the saving period pro-
vides monitoring of the creditworthiness of the contin-
gent borrowers. Hence, the CSH reduces information
asymmetries that are prevalent in credit markets. Fur-
thermore, accumulated savings minimize the maturity gap
of short-term borrowing and long-term financing within
the financial institution. Since the deposits are kept for a
specified purpose, they are not easily called off and can
form part of long-term loan funds of the bank.
A variation of the CSH can include a one-time capi-
tal grant from the government to targeted households.
Under this scheme, the households will be required to
put up a minimum savings of five percent of the total
cost of a low-cost housing unit in a bank of their choice.
Eligible households will then be provided directly with a
one-time, lumpsum capital grant in the form of a voucher.
The voucher, together with the five percent savings, will
constitute a 25 percent equity for a low-cost housing unit.
The households will assign the voucher to the pri-
vate developer or seller. The voucher, which can only be
used for home acquisition, is redeemable from the gov-
ernment. The voucher plus the savings will be the
downpayment for a housing unit and the balance of the
cost of the unit will be paid to the developer by the mort-
gage bank. The mortgage bank, which can be a govern-
ment or private bank, will provide a mortgage loan at
market rates of interest.
Under the proposed alternative subsidy scheme,
those who are creditworthy can take a housing loan. The
direct capital grant to well-targeted low-income group will
resolve the inability of the low-income group to put up
the required equity or downpayment for a housing unit.
With this form of subsidy, the low-income group will be
able to borrow from the financial institutions at competi-
tive terms. This will enable the government to direct its
resources to housing programs such as community hous-
ing and resettlement programs that clearly benefit the
very poor.6
The CSH, albeit laudable, cannot however stand
alone as a financing scheme. The financial institutions
still have to find substantial long-term funds to meet the
demand in the primary loan market. This requires the
development of stable, long-term financing sources. Still,
what should be stressed here is that the CSH brings into
the open the importance of linking it with banks.
] Contractual Savings Institutions. Contractual
savings institutions, e.g., social security, pension funds,
insurance companies and mutual funds, are showing how
important they are in the country’s financial system. In
1995, all nonbank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) ac-
counted for 20 percent of the total assets of the finan-
cial system. Of this, the share of government NBFIs, pri-
marily the social security programs, was 64 percent, an
88 percentage increase from its share of 34 percent in
1980. As such, these institutions have the potential to
————————
6Gilberto Llanto et al. (1998), "A Study of Housing Subsidies in the
Philippines." PIDS Discussion Paper Series No. 98-42.6
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accumulate vast amounts of resources which could be-
come an integral part of the capital market system. They
also normally have greater coverage and guaranteed con-
tributions in case of occupationally-based mandatory se-
curity schemes.
Contractual savings institutions have long-term con-
tracts with saving members. This helps solve the term
intermediation problems inherent to the housing sector.
Pension funds have a longer investment horizon and are
less concerned with liquidity than other financial inter-
mediaries because their liabilities are typically long-term
obligations set by actuarially-based contracts (Guérard
and Jenkins 1993).7 Thus, they can extend long-term mort-
gage loans without being exposed to liquidity risks.
In the process of development, pension funds can
also play a major role in integrating housing finance into
the capital market system. This means that the pension
institutions do not have to limit mortgage extension only
to their members but may also channel resources through
the secondary mortgage markets. Mortgage bonds are
relatively fixed investments that provide more modest re-
turns but connote lower risks for the investors. The
catch,however, is that subsidization of interest rates in
the primary mortgage market reduces the attractiveness
of this market to pension funds since the latter look for
the highest possible net yield for their members.
The success of these institutions depends on the
stability of contributions, proper regulatory framework and
efficient investment management. Their growth is largely
anchored on their proper design which consequently leads
to consumer confidence. Mandatory contribution schemes
are often tempting because they minimize the cost of
savings mobilization for the government. Through this,
the state can also exercise central control over the allo-
cation of resources.8 However, established credibility of
the institutions rather than mandatory schemes encour-
ages contributions better. Although the system can often
meet the minimum limit of contributions, it does not gen-
erate further resources from individuals outside the es-
tablishments if they are not perceived to gain from the
establishments' investments. Since contributions are au-
tomatic salary deductions, employees do not have the
option to invest in other intermediaries who may better
manage funds and generate higher returns. Hence, a
poorly designed and managed social security system sim-
ply crowds out efficient private participants.
Fitting reforms in the regulatory policies and insti-
tutional design that specifically govern the contractual
savings institutions and social security systems should
therefore be effected to maximize their potential in mobi-
lizing long-term sources of funds and making them avail-
able for long-term investments such as housing.
] Mortgage-backed Securities. An important in-
novation in the financial market is the securitization of
assets. Asset securitization is the process of pooling as-
sets and using the pool formed as collateral for a secu-
rity. The securities created are referred to as asset-backed
securities.9
Securitization can improve access to mortgage fi-
nancing by separating origination from funding. As a con-
————————
7Yves Guérard and Glenn Jenkins, Building Private Pension Sys-
tems: A Handbook. International Center for Economic Growth and the
Harvard Institute for International Development, 1993.
8Bertrand Renaud, "Housing and Financial Institutions.” World
Bank Staff Working Papers, WPS 658, Washington D.C., August 1984.
9Frank Fabozzi, Overview of Mortgage-Backed and Asset-Backed
Securities.
"Fitting reforms in the regulatory policies
and institutional design that specifically
govern the contractual savings institutions
and social security systems should there-
fore be effected to maximize their poten-
tial in mobilizing long-term sources of
funds and making them available for long-
term investments such as housing."7
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sequence, home mortgage finance will be integrated into
the overall capital market.10 It will provide liquidity through
a recycling mechanism at interest rates that are often
more profitable than what the issuer of the assets would
get under more conventional financing given its credit-
worthiness.11
Mortgage-backed securities is a vehicle for linking
the primary market with access to long-term funds that
are critical for long-term investments such as housing.
The modern model of housing finance uses the second-
ary mortgage market where loans are securitized and
issued to investors. Traditional mortgage lenders in the
primary mortgage market originate and service mortgage
assets. Mortgage companies, on the other hand, buy
loans from the primary market, package them and
securitize them.
For the primary and secondary mortgage markets
to develop, however, there is a need to develop the le-
gal, institutional and regulatory infrastructure that will
minimize risks in origination of primary mortgage loans
and securitization, ensure market pricing of mortgage
a dent to the problem. What is needed is to make the
housing market, including housing finance, work effi-
ciently. For this to happen, the present administration
should pursue the housing program proposed under the
stewardship of former Secretary Karina David and under-
take a number of reforms, to wit:
] Rationalize the government’s housing programs
and institutions.
] Promote a market-based housing finance sys-
tem as a mechanism for financing low-cost housing.
] Target subsidies, e.g., one-time capital allow-
ance, to well-identified low-income households.
] Require targeted households to mobilize sav-
ings as equity contribution in the low-cost housing pro-
gram of government.
] Stimulate the private rental housing market by
lifting rent control and providing on-site (upgrading) and
off-site (new developments) services to localities outside
the major metropolises.
] Provide infrastructure that will lead to the open-
ing of new lands for low-cost housing.
] Review zoning regulations, building codes and
other regulations, e.g., development permits, land con-
version, and others, to eliminate high transaction cost.
] Introduce reforms in the pension funds to make
more long-term funds available for housing.
] Review/amend the Comprehensive Shelter and
Finance Act and the Urban Development and Housing Act
to make them more consistent with a market-based hous-
ing finance system.
] Provide a legal, institutional and regulatory in-
frastructure for the efficient functioning of the primary
and secondary mortgage markets.
] Maintain a stable macroeconomic condition
characterized by low inflation and low interest rates.  4 4
————————
10Simon Kwan, “Innovations and Recent Developments in Mort-
gage-Backed Securities.” FRBSF Weekly Letter, Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco, Number 96-01, January 5, 1996.
11Lynn Soukup, “When Assets Become Securities Financing: The
ABC’s of Asset Securitization,” online version (www.shawpittman.come/
soukup.html), Shaw Pittman Potts & Trowbridge, 1996.
"Mortgage-backed securities is a vehicle for
linking the primary market with access to
long-term funds that are critical for long-
term investments such as housing."
assets and provide credit enhancement mechanisms.
Again, subsidization of interest rates in the primary mar-
ket negates the development of a strong secondary mar-
ket.
The need for a comprehensive view
and understanding of the housing problem
The housing problem is not simply a funding issue.
Some quarters make the erroneous assertion that throw-
ing money to the problem solves it. In the first place,
under a distorted system, no amount of money can make8
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